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ABSTRACT
Introduction Intravenous medication administration 
has traditionally been regarded as error prone, with high 
potential for harm. A recent US multisite study revealed few 
potentially harmful errors despite a high overall error rate. 
However, there is limited evidence about infusion practices 
in England and how they relate to prevalence and types of 
error.
Objectives To determine the prevalence, types and severity 
of errors and discrepancies in infusion administration in 
English hospitals, and to explore sources of variation, 
including the contribution of smart pumps.
Methods We conducted an observational point prevalence 
study of intravenous infusions in 16 National Health 
Service hospital trusts. Observers compared each infusion 
against the medication order and local policy. Deviations 
were classified as errors or discrepancies based on their 
potential for patient harm. Contextual issues and reasons 
for deviations were explored qualitatively during observer 
debriefs.
Results Data were collected from 1326 patients and 
2008 infusions. Errors were observed in 231 infusions 
(11.5%, 95% CI 10.2% to 13.0%). Discrepancies were 
observed in 1065 infusions (53.0%, 95% CI 50.8% to 
55.2%). Twenty-three errors (1.1% of all infusions) were 
considered potentially harmful; none were judged likely to 
prolong hospital stay or result in long-term harm. Types and 
prevalence of errors and discrepancies varied widely among 
trusts, as did local policies. Deviations from medication 
orders and local policies were sometimes made for efficiency 
or patient need. Smart pumps, as currently implemented, 
had little effect, with similar error rates observed in infusions 
delivered with and without a smart pump (10.3% vs 10.8%, 
p=0.8).
Conclusion Errors and discrepancies are relatively 
common in everyday infusion administrations but most have 
low potential for patient harm. Better understanding of 
performance variability to strategically manage risk may be a 
more helpful tactic than striving to eliminate all deviations.
INTRODUCTION
Intravenous medication administration 
is complex, and data suggest that errors 
are common. For example, a systematic 
review of nine studies across various 
stages of intravenous medication prepa-
ration and administration reported errors 
in 73% of intravenous doses.1 However, 
published error rates vary widely, from 
18% to 173% of intravenous doses in 
studies using structured observation of 
medication administration.2 
Amidst concerns over safety, technol-
ogies such as smart pumps have been 
advocated. These incorporate dose error 
reduction software to check programmed 
infusion rates against preset limits within a 
customisable drug library. However, dose 
limits can be over-ridden, and evidence 
regarding their impact is mixed.3 4 While 
unintended infusion overdoses repre-
sent a major safety concern, there are 
many factors that affect infusion admin-
istration, and smart pumps are just one 
possible solution.
A recent multisite US study using 
structured observation reported a high 
prevalence of intravenous infusion admin-
istration errors and procedural failures, 
even with the use of smart pumps, yet few 
potentially harmful errors.4 Building on 
this and an earlier US study,5 we therefore 
wanted to conduct a similar study in the 
UK with a larger sample size6 to confirm 
or refute these findings in a different 
context in which smart pumps are less 
common. In contrast to previous studies, 
we also wanted to incorporate a Safety II 
approach to interpret our findings.7 This 
approach moves away from the tradi-
tional focus of classifying all deviations 
as errors and blaming the human for 
unreliable processes. Instead it encour-
ages consideration of deviations in terms 
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of performance variability, how to understand and 
manage this variability, and that the human compo-
nent can make positive contributions to safety.7 8 Our 
objectives were to determine the prevalence, types 
and severity of errors and discrepancies in intravenous 
infusions in England and to explore sources of vari-
ation, including the potential contribution of smart 
pumps, using a Safety II approach.
METHODS
Study design
We used a point prevalence observational study 
of intravenous infusions in a sample of hospitals, 
followed by debriefs with staff at each site to gather 
additional context. Although we built on previous 
studies,4 5 we did not consider all deviations from the 
medication order or local policy to be errors: minor 
or intentional deviations were classed as discrepancies. 
The study protocol was published previously6 and 
the study was approved by a National Health Service 
(NHS) Research Ethics Committee (14/SC/0290).
Study setting and sample
We used a purposive sampling strategy to select 16 
NHS trusts in England, aiming for a diverse range of 
organisations in terms of type, size, location, patient 
safety metrics and use of infusion devices and smart 
pump technology.6 Online supplementary appendices 
1 and 2 summarise the recruitment process and char-
acteristics of each participating trust. We conducted 
observations in three clinical areas (general medicine, 
general surgery and critical care) in 13 trusts; in eight 
of these we also conducted observations in paediatrics 
and oncology day care. Two specialist childrens hospi-
tals collected paediatric data only. One further trust 
collected oncology day care data at three hospital sites. 
We aimed to include a sample of 2100 infusions across 
all participating sites to give a CI around a 10% error 
rate of 8.7%11.3%.6
Data collection
Data were collected between April 2015 and December 
2016. At each trust, two observers (usually a nurse and a 
pharmacist) employed in the organisation were trained 
by the research team to collect data. This training 
included highlighting the types of deviations to look 
for, conducting observations in the presence of the 
research team where possible and using sample cases to 
facilitate discussion about classification of deviations 
identified. Observers were also requested to identify 
and familiarise themselves with relevant local policies 
and guidelines prior to data collection. Observers then 
spent 1 weekday or equivalent collecting data in each 
clinical area. One clinical area could comprise one or 
more wards. Observers aimed to collect data on all 
intravenous infusions being administered at the time 
of data collection, including drugs, fluids, blood prod-
ucts and nutrition. Bolus doses were excluded, except 
where a prescribed bolus was given as an infusion, or 
vice versa. Completed infusions were excluded even if 
still attached to the patient. Patients were not observed 
if they were in isolation due to infection risks, were 
receiving care that would have required interruption 
or were off the ward.
Observers compared each medication being admin-
istered against the prescription and local policies/
guidance,6 and consulted clinical staff if needed to 
understand any deviations. Data were recorded using 
a standardised paper form and subsequently uploaded 
to a secure web-based tool.9 No patient identifiable 
data were recorded. Suspected errors were raised with 
clinical staff so they could be corrected if needed; local 
reporting practices were then followed.
Identifying and assessing deviations
We recorded any deviations from a prescribers 
written or electronic medication order, the hospitals 
intravenous policy and guidelines, or the manufactur-
ers instructions. We included the administration of 
medication to which the patient had a documented 
allergy or sensitivity, but did not assess other aspects of 
the clinical appropriateness of the medication order. 
We also collected data on policy violations and proce-
dural or documentation deviations that may increase 
the likelihood of medication administration errors 
occurring. These included patients not wearing an 
identification wristband with the correct information, 
medication or infusion administration sets not being 
labelled in accordance with hospital policy and failure 
to document the administration of medication in line 
with policy. Finally, we encouraged observers to record 
any other irregularities, anomalies or workarounds 
related to the administration. Some of these were 
grouped together for analysis and formed new catego-
ries. Online supplementary appendix 3 presents defi-
nitions of deviation types.
Local observers rated each deviation using an adap-
tation of the National Coordinating Council for Medi-
cation Error Reporting and Prevention (NCCMERP) 
severity index.10 Ratings were based on the likelihood 
of the deviation resulting in patient harm if it had not 
been intercepted, and were used to classify the devia-
tions as discrepancies (rated A1 or A2) or errors (rated 
from Cto I) (online supplementary appendix 4).6 Based 
on these ratings we developed and clarified our clas-
sifications, recognising that deviations could be either 
errors or discrepancies, either in medication adminis-
tration or in the associated procedural and documen-
tation requirements (figure 1). We report separately 
on a comparison between the NCCMERP ratings and 
an alternative severity classification method based on 
expert judgement.11
Observers at each trust documented brief descrip-
tions of any deviations identified and provided further 
qualitative insights during semistructured debriefs 
once data collection was complete.
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Data management and analysis
Clinicians within the research team reviewed devia-
tions that had uncertain classifications, for example, 
where local observers highlighted that they found 
categorisation difficult and where observers had clas-
sified similar deviations differently. Clinicians within 
the research team also reviewed each error rated cate-
gory D (likely to have required increased monitoring 
and/or intervention to preclude harm) and above. 
Minor changes were made to classifications of type 
and severity of error as needed.
Error and discrepancy rates were calculated as the 
proportion of infusions with at least one error or 
discrepancy using total opportunities for error (total 
number of doses administered, plus any omitted doses) 
as the denominator. Results are presented according 
to overall error and discrepancy rates, and individual 
types of errors and discrepancies, grouped into medi-
cation administration deviations, and procedural and 
documentation deviations. Variations in deviation 
rates between clinical areas, delivery modes and infu-
sion types were explored descriptively with their 95% 
CIs, and Χ2 tests where appropriate. Qualitative data 
were analysed inductively.
RESULTS
Overall, 6491 patients were present in the clinical 
areas observed, of whom 1545 (23.8%) were receiving 
and/or prescribed an intravenous infusion at the time 
of data collection. Data were collected from 1326 
(85.8%) patients, who were administered and/or 
prescribed 2008 infusions.
Frequency, types and potential severity of errors and 
discrepancies
Overall, 240 errors and 1491 discrepancies were 
identified across 2008 intravenous infusions. Table 1 
presents the numbers and percentages of infusions and 
patients affected. Table 2 shows the types of devia-
tions observed and their likely harm. Ninety per cent 
of observed errors were considered unlikely to cause 
harm despite reaching the patient (NCCMERP cate-
gory C). Twenty-two errors (9.5%) were category 
D, and one (0.4%) category E; these 23 potentially 
harmful errors represent 1.1% of infusions. Examples 
in each severity category are presented in table 3.
Medication administration deviations
Overall, 427 (21.3%) infusions involved at least one 
medication administration error (n=211) or discrep-
ancy (n=257). The most frequent types of deviation 
concerned rates and unauthorised medications.
Rate deviations
Overall, 152 infusions (7.6%) were being administered 
at a different rate from that prescribed; 77 were classi-
ILHGDVHUURUVUDWHG&DQGDVGLVFUHSDQFLHVUDWHG
A1 or A2). A large proportion involved order changes 
that had not been correctly documented and infusions 
titrated based on the patients clinical need or fluid 
allowance without such titration being prescribed. 
Three deviations involved prescribed boluses admin-
istered as infusions, and one was a prescribed infusion 
given as a bolus.
About 31% of rate errors occurred in infusions 
delivered via gravity (without using a pump), despite 
Figure 1 Classiication of deviations, errors and discrepancies.
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accounting for just 8% of infusions. Of the 12 most 
serious rate errors (rated D), eight were administered 
via gravity; these included red blood cells, vancomycin, 
paracetamol and piperacillin/tazobactam. Many medi-
cation orders specified a duration rather than rate (eg, 
over 8 hours). In one case an infusion was observed 
running at a very high rate to catch up1 L of Plas-
malyte 148 had been prescribed over 24 hours; at the 
time of observation, 27 hours after the start time, the 
rate was set at 500 mL/hour.
Unauthorised medication
Eighty-nine infusions did not have a corresponding 
medication order. Thirteen were flushes that did 
not require a medication order according to local 
policy. Therefore, 76 infusions (3.8%; 75 errors, one 
discrepancy) were judged to be unauthorised. Almost 
half were fluids used to flush the line, commonly in 
oncology settings, including sodium chloride 0.9% 
(n=29), dextrose (1), Plasmalyte (2) and heparin 
(3). A further seven infusions were sodium chloride 
0.9% administered at low rates to keep the vein 
open. Twenty infusions were unauthorised repeats of 
previously prescribed maintenance fluids. Four were 
administered based on verbal orders that had not 
been documented at the time of observation. Of the 
remaining 10 unauthorised infusions, seven involved 
maintenance fluids and three were drugs (calcium foli-
nate, remifentanil, insulin). The remifentanil infusion 
had been prescribed and subsequently discontinued, 
but not represcribed after a decision to resedate the 
patient.
Procedural and documentation deviations
Overall, 961 infusions (47.9%) had at least one proce-
dural or documentation error (n=24) or discrepancy 
(n=1219). Table 2 shows the frequency and severity 
of different types of procedural and documentation 
deviations. Non-compliance with hospital require-
ments for labelling infusion administration sets was 
most common. Procedural or documentation errors 
mostly involved unlabelled syringes, or infusions 
where the label was significantly inaccurate. For 
example, a patient prescribed 60 mg pamidronate was 
being administered an infusion labelled as 30 mg, but 
staff confirmed the patient had received the correct 
dose.
While some of the discrepancies identified in our 
study were deviations from protocols that may have 
been intentional workarounds, this was not always 
the case. Some were minor, non-clinically significant 
variations from what was prescribed that did not meet 
our definition of a medication administration error 
(eg, small deviations in flow rate or concentration, 
or minor delays to maintenance fluids start or finish 
times due to being interrupted to administer intrave-
nous antibiotics), and some were minor documenta-
tion discrepancies.T
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Sources of variation in error and discrepancy rates
Error rates among trusts ranged from 2.7% to 24.4%, 
and discrepancy rates from 13.5% to 100% of infu-
sions, with no evidence of a relationship between 
error and discrepancy rates (figure 2). Procedural or 
documentation deviations ranged from 9.9% to 100% 
of infusions across trusts, reflecting wide variation in 
hospital policies and how they were enacted in prac-
tice. Some trusts had stringent policy requirements (eg, 
trust K) whereas others did not (eg, trust J); some had 
requirements that staff were unaware of in practice 
(eg, trusts D and P).
Variation was also evident among clinical areas 
and different infusion types (online supplementary 
appendix 5). Infusions observed in critical care had a 
lower error rate (7.0%); the error rate for paediatric 
areas was similar to that for adult non-critical care 
areas. Patient-controlled analgesia pumps and syringe 
drivers had the lowest error rates at 6.4% and 5.1%, 
respectively, with infusions delivered via gravity the 
highest (21.5% of 163 infusions). Error rates also 
varied by type of medication; maintenance fluids (eg, 
sodium chloride 0.9%) had a high error rate (18.5%) 
compared with drugs (6.9%), blood products (9.1%) 
and parenteral nutrition (2.9%).
Eleven of 16 hospitals (69%) used smart pumps (ie, 
an infusion pump with a drug library and/or dose error 
reduction software enabled) in at least one clinical 
area. However, just 640 (32%) infusions were admin-
istered using a smart pump (online supplementary 
appendix 5). Infusions delivered using smart pumps 
had similar error rates to those using other pumps 
(10.3% vs 10.8%; p=0.8). No appropriate entry was 
available in the drug library for one-third of infusions 
administered using a smart pump. Of 424 infusions 
with a library entry available, the library was used in 
356 (84%) cases. There was no significant difference 
in error rates for doses given via a drug library versus 
those given without (online supplementary appendix 
5). Discrepancy rates were higher in infusions deliv-
ered using smart pumps (61.7% of 640 infusions) 
Table 2 Number, frequency and potential severity of each type of deviation
Type of deviation
Errors Discrepancies
NCCMERP severity rating
n (% of 2008 
infusions)
NCCMERP severity 
rating
n (% of 2008 
infusions)C D E A1 A2
Medication administration deviations
  Rate deviation 65 12 – 77 (3.8) 48 27 75 (3.7)
  Unauthorised medication 72 3 – 75 (3.7) – 1 1 (0.0)
  Administration start time discrepancy 13 – – 13 (0.6) 31 8 39 (1.9)
  Incomplete or delayed completion 10 – – 10 (0.5) 4 27 31 (1.5)
  Expired drug 11 – – 11 (0.5) 1 1 2 (0.1)
  Dose discrepancy 5 2 – 7 (0.3) 6 6 12 (0.6)
  Wrong drug/luid/diluent 11 – – 11 (0.5) 1 1 2 (0.1)
  Omitted medications (not administered at time of 
data collection)
2 3 – 5 (0.2) 1 6 7 (0.3)
  Roller clamp positioned incorrectly or inappropriately 1 – – 1 (0.0) – 10 10 (0.5)
  Concentration discrepancy – – 1 1 (0.0) 7 2 9 (0.4)
  Drug library not used or incorrectly used (in the case 
of smart pumps)
– – – – – 67 67 (3.3)
  Allergy oversight – – – – 2 – 2 (0.1)
All medication administration deviations 190 20 1 211 101 156 257
Procedure or documentation deviations
  Infusion administration set not tagged/labelled 
correctly
– – – – – 537 537 (26.8)
  Documentation of the administration 1 – – 1 (0.0) – 334 334 (16.6)
  Additive label missing or incorrect 16 1 – 17 (0.8) 2 200 202 (10.1)
  Patient identiication* 6 – – 6 (0.3) – 110 110 (5.5)
  Documentation of the medication order – – – – 7 31 36 (1.8)
All procedure or documentation deviations 23 1 – 24 9 1212 1219
Miscellaneous 4 1 – 5 (0.2) 4 9 13 (0.6)
All deviations 217 22 1 240 114 1377 1491
*Deviations are counted per infusion; this igure includes patient identiication deviations (ie, no name band) applied to all infusions for those patients. 
There were 88 patient identiication discrepancies, counting each once per patient.
NCCMERP, National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention. 
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compared with those without smart features (46.4% of 
1202 infusions, p<0.001). Sixty-seven discrepancies 
were identified in the use of a smart pump drug library: 
61 where the drug library was bypassed completely 
and six where the wrong entry was selected. However, 
differences in discrepancy rates were more commonly 
linked with policy requirements for labelling infusions 
and administration sets at different sites; when discrep-
ancies related to use of a drug library are excluded, the 
discrepancy rate remains higher in infusions delivered 
via smart pump (59.2% of 640 infusions).
Qualitative insights
Information provided by observers revealed some 
reasons for deviations. Some were simple slips or 
lapses such as confusing diluents and forgetting 
to open roller clamps to start the infusion; others 
involved lack of knowledge of policy requirements. 
Staff also reported deliberate deviations that would 
benefit patients but conflicted with official rules and 
formal procedures, for example, giving patients fluids 
that had not yet been prescribed when a doctor was 
unavailable (unauthorised fluids) and keeping lines 
patent by switching to a low infusion rate in anticipa-
tion of another infusion being needed (rate deviation). 
There were several instances of inaccurate prescrip-
tions that were corrected and administered by nurses 
without getting the order changed prior to adminis-
tration. However, in one case the administering nurse 
incorrectly assumed an unusual prescription was 
wrong (table 3piperacillin/tazobactam).
In some instances, nursing staff actively tried to 
balance risk and efficiency rather than follow proce-
dures mechanistically. For example, staff reported 
stopping infusions (delay in completion) when patients 
left the ward for investigations so a nurse did not have 
to accompany the patient when staffing resources 
were stretched. In addition, some nurses objected to 
spending time labelling administration sets and writing 
batch numbers on additive labels for short infusions 
that would soon be discarded.
Observers at some trusts reported that collecting 
the study data provided insights into the reasons for 
some deviations and helped them identify solutions. 
For example, at one site where poor compliance with 
documentation of medication administration was 
recorded, the trust subsequently purchased handheld 
computers to allow staff to access electronic records in 
closer proximity to patients.
DISCUSSION
We found that 1 in 10 intravenous infusions involved 
an error, and one in two involved a discrepancy. 
However, few were considered likely to cause patient 
harm. There was considerable variability in errors, 
discrepancies, policies and practices among trusts. Our 
mixed methods approach offers insights into some 
reasons for this variability. Nurses can be a source of 
resilience, compensating for deficiencies and vulner-
abilities in the system; however, this same adaptive 
capacity can also lead to unsatisfactory outcomes.12 
Informed by Safety II, 7 8 our findings suggest the need 
to question traditional notions of error and the goal 
of eliminating all errors and discrepancies. Instead we 
reflect on a broader notion of deviations, highlight 
positive contributions to efficiency and safety that go 
beyond compliance and explore strategic interventions 
to manage performance variability.
Disentangling errors, discrepancies and harm
Overall, we found a lower error rate (11.5%) than 
that reported in much research into intravenous 
medication error (range 35%85.9%).1315 Some of 
this difference can be explained by methodological 
differences, for example, inclusion of bolus doses and 
Table 3 Examples of observed deviations in the administration 
of intravenous infusions
Severity 
category Examples
E  Ź Patient was administered 2 g vancomycin diluted in 250 mL of 
sodium chloride 0.9%. The drug should have been diluted in 
500 mL of sodium chloride 0.9% (concentration error: severity 
category E) and administered over at least 240 min. The drug 
was observed running too fast via gravity feed (rate error: D). 
The chart had not been signed to conirm the administration had 
been double-checked as required (documentation discrepancy: 
A2). The patient suffered from pain and red lumps along arm.
D  Ź Piperacillin/tazobactam was prescribed to be given over 3 hours. 
However, it was given as a bolus over 3–5 min, which is the 
most common way to administer this antibiotic. The nurses 
presumed the doctors had made a mistake and corrected it. 
However, this had been prescribed intentionally after discussions 
with the consultant, with microbiology, with pharmacy and the 
drug manufacturer due to the patient’s poor renal function. This 
clinical decision was recorded in the patient’s notes but nursing 
staff had not reviewed these.
 Ź 40 mmol of potassium chloride rather than the prescribed 
20 mmol was administered together with 10 mmol magnesium 
sulfate in sodium chloride 0.9% at 1000 mL/hour.
C  Ź  1 L sodium chloride 0.9% with potassium chloride 0.15% was 
prescribed over 12 hours. The documented start time was 23:25. 
When observed at 13:00 the following day the infusion was not 
running and approximately 150 mL remained. The infusion should 
have been complete but the pump was not plugged in and the 
battery was empty.
 Ź A medication order for 20 mcg fentanyl stated diluent as 
dextrose 5%, however the drug was prepared and administered 
in sodium chloride 0.9%.
A2  Ź Electronic prescription speciied 1 L of sodium chloride 0.9% 
over 8 hours. Started at 02:00 thus due to inish 10:00 but at 
09:25 there was still 500 mL to run. The infusion was paused 
at the time of observation as the patient was receiving an 
intermittent amoxicillin infusion.
 Ź Hartmann’s solution had been selected in the smart pump’s drug 
library but the infusion being administered was sodium chloride 
0.9% (at the correct rate prescribed).
A1  Ź The prescribed rate was 250 mL/hour for 123 mg paclitaxel in 
250 mL sodium chloride 0.9%. However, the inal reconstituted 
volume was 290.5 mL, which was being infused at 290 mL/hour 
to give the same rate of administration as prescribed.
 Ź Administration of piperacillin/tazobactam was delayed by 
approximately 30 min.
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preparation errors in other studies. The difficulties in 
comparing error rates between studies using different 
methods and definitions, in different contexts, have 
been well documented.15 16 Comparing studies using 
similar methods,4 5 we found broadly comparable rates 
of potentially harmful errors, with errors rated D or 
above in 1.1% of infusions in our study, and 0.4%4 
and 3.8%5 elsewhere. We also identified similar error 
types, with the most common medication adminis-
tration errors being rate deviations and unauthor-
ised medications, and the most common procedural 
and documentation deviations concerning labelling 
of medication and administration sets. However, our 
overall error rate remains lower than in these studies, 
probably due to our more nuanced distinction between 
errors and discrepancies.
While several studies consider the potential harm 
associated with errors and some distinguish between 
medication administration errors and procedural 
failures or policy violations,4 13 we are not aware of 
previous studies that sought to understand the context 
of the deviation by distinguishing errors and discrepan-
cies. Researchers and practitioners may have differing 
views on what constitutes an error,17 with a range of 
situations identified that clinicians may not consider 
errors.18 19 These judgements are largely ignored in 
definitions of errors adopted in most previous studies. 
Separation of discrepancies and errors in our study 
allowed us to better capture the complexities of current 
intravenous practices, and may be more acceptable to 
clinicians who feel that the realities of practice mean 
that policies cannot always be adhered to.
Previous studies have highlighted the importance 
of procedural failures and policy violations in identi-
fying system weaknesses that may create latent condi-
tions for patient harm.5 In this study, we recognise 
that both medication administration and procedural/
documentation deviations occur on a spectrum from 
minor discrepancies to serious errors with potential 
for harm. While severe errors naturally attract greater 
attention, and are often the focus for intervention, a 
Safety II perspective encourages us to look at normal 
discrepancies to identify potential system weaknesses. 
According to Safety II, people make adjustments to 
respond to the demands of the situation and compen-
sate for system weaknesses. We identified several cases 
where these adjustments avoided or mitigated poten-
tial harm. However, these same adaptive mechanisms 
Figure 2 Variation in error and discrepancy rates between National Health Service (NHS) trusts.
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can also lead to unsatisfactory outcomes, as identified 
in one instance in this study. A challenge for safety 
management is that everyday discrepancies appear 
trivial but can contribute to rarer and more serious inci-
dents.20 Our approach to distinguishing discrepancies 
and errors may help clinicians to reflect on different 
kinds of deviations, consider which are important and 
identify discrepancy patterns that may be concerning.
Policy and practice gaps
Much of the variability among trusts related to gaps 
between policy and practice. Better understanding 
of the reasons behind such performance variability is 
necessary to target interventions that improve safety. 
Procedural and documentation deviations may not 
always represent poor practice but rather a poor fit 
between official policy and everyday practice due to 
situational constraints. In some cases, policies that 
better reflect existing practice may be more beneficial in 
managing risk to both patients and staff than enforcing 
compliance with existing policy. For example, policies 
allowing administration of flushes without a medi-
cation order in specific circumstances or for specific 
patient groups, already in place in many trusts, could 
be introduced at hospitals where unprescribed flushes 
are accepted local practice by clinical staff but are tech-
nically unauthorised. National standardisation may be 
helpful for whether or not small volume flushes need 
to be prescribed and if so how, labelling requirements 
for intravenous infusions and giving sets, and require-
ments for double-checking.
Implications for practice: strategic interventions and 
smart pumps
Appreciating the nuances of frequency, types and 
severity of deviations occurring in different contexts 
moves us beyond interventions focused on improving 
compliance and eliminating error, towards more stra-
tegic interventions to proactively manage risk. Care is 
rarely delivered in ideal circumstances and a more prag-
matic and practical approach, incorporating a wider 
range of strategies, is needed.8 Strategic decisions to 
live with certain deviations might be made if efforts to 
resolve them are likely to distract from other aspects 
of patient care, or not translate into gains for patient 
safety. More work is needed to understand if and how 
routine performance variability in intravenous infu-
sions can spiral into rare and unsatisfactory outcomes, 
what conditions contribute to poor outcomes and 
which interventions should be prioritised to prevent 
harm rather than only reducing discrepancies.
Smart pumps are one possible intervention to 
improve safety in intravenous infusion administration. 
Similar to previous US studies,4 5 we found that smart 
pumps, as currently implemented in English hospitals, 
do not seem to reduce the risk of error in everyday 
practice. Although smart pumps may have a role in 
preventing more severe and rare errors, our relatively 
limited observation periods did not identify these. In 
addition, greater attention to the configuration and 
usability of pumps is required: a third of smart pumps 
used in our study offered no advantage over standard 
pumps due to incomplete drug libraries. Using smart 
pumps as part of an integrated system with bar code 
scanning and interfacing with electronic systems could 
guard against a broader range of deviations. Although 
the costs and benefits of implementing such a system 
have not yet been established,4 5 such approaches 
have become standard practice in the USA as both 
were included in the governments Meaningful Use 
programme, which provides financial incentives to 
promote the use of health information technologies 
to improve quality. Such configurations are rare in 
English hospitals; no participating trusts used bar code 
administration, and only a minority had trust-wide 
electronic prescribing and medication administration 
records. The high error rate associated with infusions 
delivered without a pump in our study suggests that 
efforts to reduce reliance on gravity feed, where it is 
difficult to control the delivery rate, may be a more 
immediate and achievable priority than the expansion 
of smart pump technology.
Strengths and limitations
This was a large multisite study, incorporating hospi-
tals with widely differing medication processes and 
systems, reflecting the diversity of intravenous infusion 
practices within the English NHS. Adopting a mixed 
methods approach provided a rich understanding of 
intravenous medication errors and the contexts in 
which they occur. There are advantages and disadvan-
tages of using local observers versus observers from 
a research team. Employing local data collectors may 
have allowed less conspicuous observation and reduced 
the likelihood of nurses modifying their behaviour on 
observation days. However, using local staff may have 
resulted in some interobserver variability or institu-
tional blindness to local poor practice. Variability was 
minimised as much as possible by using two observers 
from different professional backgrounds at each site 
where possible, providing training, and subsequent 
review of data by the multidisciplinary research team. 
Resource limitations and confidentiality agreements 
precluded measurement of interobserver reliability 
across sites.
Other limitations are acknowledged. The timing 
of data collection at each trust depended on local 
approvals and staff availability; both daily and 
seasonal variation in staffing levels and workload 
may have affected deviation rates. We focused on 
infusions running at the time of observation and will 
therefore have underestimated the overall medication 
administration error rate; observation of prescribing, 
dispensing, preparation and setting up infusions is 
likely to have revealed further errors.21 Errors already 
identified and corrected by smart pumps or a double 
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check by another staff member prior to our obser-
vations would also not be captured using our meth-
odology. Ward managers were aware the study was 
investigating medication administration errors and 
discrepancies, so it is possible that nurses changed 
their behaviour on observation days. However, obser-
vation dates were not publicised in advance and nurses 
were not directly observed, thus the impact is likely 
minimal. Finally, our study was not powered to test 
for associations between pump and infusion types and 
error rates; our findings instead highlight areas for 
further investigation.
CONCLUSION
Overall, we identified errors in 1 in 10 infusions, but 
very few were likely to result in patient harm. Smart 
pumps, as currently implemented, seemed to have little 
effect, with similar error rates observed in infusions 
delivered with and without a smart pump. Measuring 
the prevalence, types and severity of errors and discrep-
ancies can provide valuable insights for reflection. 
However, this needs to be coupled to causal accounts 
and contextual understanding of local hospital poli-
cies, cultures, customs and practices. Not all deviations 
from medication order or policy are bad; many arise 
as nurses actively manage safety and productivity pres-
sures. This study suggests there is a need to shift the 
focus away from the goal of eliminating deviations to 
enable strategic intervention to manage infusion risk 
in the context of everyday performance variability 
and working conditions. Future work should explore 
where efforts should be targeted to prevent harm 
rather than only reducing discrepancies.
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